

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 184609

E.O. 11652; GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR, CH
SUBJ: POLADS AGENDA: SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS

REFS: A) BUDAPEST 3155; B) MOSCOW 10982; C) MOSCOW 10953
C) USNATO 4029

1. IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL CITED REFTEL D, MISSION MAY
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WISH TO DRAW ON OTHER MORE RECENT REFTELS CITED ABOVE IN

DISCUSSING SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS. IN ADDITION, YOU MAY UTILIZE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS.

2. THE MARKED UPSURGE IN SOVIET POLEMICS AGAINST CHINA OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS, WHICH HAS INCLUDED AN AUTHORITATIVE SPEECH BY BREZHNEV AND A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN FROM MOST OF MOSCOW'S CLIENT STATES IN EAST EUROPE, HAS TAKEN ON ADDED SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE OF SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE GEARING UP A DRIVE FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES. THE EVIDENCE THUS FAR HOWEVER, IS INSUFFICIENT TO INDICATE THAT MOSCOW IS EMBARKING ON A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW POLICY COURSE TOWARD PEKING OR IS SEEKING TO HAVE CHINA DEFINITELY EXPELLED FROM THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

3. MOSCOW'S NEW ROUND OF ANTI-CHINESE POLEMICS IS PROBABLY RELATED BOTH TO THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE OF WARSAW PACT LEADERS IN LATE JULY, AT WHICH CHINA APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT TOPIC OF DISCUSSION, AND TO THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE LATTER PART OF AUGUST AND WHICH CONFIRMED THE BASIC ANTI-SOVIET THRUST OF CHINESE POLICY. THE NONALIGNED CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS ALSO PROVIDED AN OCCASION FOR EACH SIDE TO QUESTION THE OTHER'S THIRD WORLD POLICIES. MOSCOW'S PATIENCE HAS ALSO BEEN STRAINED BY PEKING'S CONTINUAL SNIPING AT SOVIET DETENTE DIPLOMACY AND, IN PARTICULAR, BY CHOU EN-LAI'S OVERT ENCOURAGEMENT FOR A STRONG WESTERN DEFENSE POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

4. MOSCOW CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S "ANTI-SOCIALIST" AND ANTI-SOVIET COURSE (THE LATTER INEVITABLY IMPLIES THE FORMER IN SOVIET THINKING) WARRANTS CONDEMNATION BY ALL ORTHODOX PARTIES, AND THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR UNHAPPINESS OVER ROMANIA'S STEADFAST REFUSAL TO JOIN A WARSAW PACT CONSENSUS TO THIS EFFECT. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE AS A RULE TO OBSERVE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP, WHICH IS SAID TO HAVE BROKEN WITH MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES, AND CHINA ITSELF, WHOSE SOCIALIST ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE BEEN THREATENED BUT NOT ENTIRELY DESTROYED BY MAOIST

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POLICIES. MOREOVER, MOSCOW'S CHANCES OF HAVING CHINA READ OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT APPEAR NO BETTER NOW THAN BEFORE, GIVEN THE CERTAINTY THAT NORTH VIETNAM, NORTH KOREA, ROMANIA AND ASSORTED NON-RULING PARTIES WOULD OPPOSE AN ATTEMPT TO EXCOMMUNICATE PEKING.

5. NEVERTHELESS, MOSCOW MAY BELIEVE IT CAN ENGINEER A REPLAY OF THE 1969 WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES.

WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD DEAL WITH THE CHINA PROBLEM IN A DEFINITIVE FASHION, FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT IT COULD SERVE THE USEFUL PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING PEKING'S ISOLATION IN THE MOVEMENT AND REAFFIRMING MOSCOW'S LEADING ROLE. CURRENT SIGNS, HOWEVER, ARE THAT MOSCOW WILL FACE HARD GOING IN CONVINCING OTHER PARTIES THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE IS DESIRABLE.

6. THE RESULTS OF THE TENTH CHINESE CONGRESS COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN GRATIFYING TO THE SOVIETS, EVEN THOUGH CHOU EN-LAI AT LEAST FORMALLY LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVED STATE RELATIONS. THE CONGRESS REITERATED IN STRONG TERMS THE ANTI-SOVIET IMPULSE AND PRAGMATIC DIRECTIONS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND BRANDED THE USSR AS THE CHIEF THREAT TO CHINESE SECURITY. CHOU SPECIFICALLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST CHINA, BUT HE DID NOT SEEM ESPECIALLY ALARMED AT THE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS PROSPECT, IN LINE WITH PEKING'S GENERAL

TONING DOWN OF THIS ISSUE. PRIVATELY, SOVIET CHINA SPECIALISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO PLAY DOWN ANY ANXIETIES THEY MAY HAVE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE CONGRESS ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND HAVE STRESSED THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING CHINESE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

7. SHOULD DISCUSSION TOUCH ON THE SO-CALLED "SAMOKHIN DOCUMENT" THAT FIRST SURFACED IN THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH AUGUST 9 AND WHICH RAISES THE SPECTER OF SOVIET PREVENTIVE WAR AGAINST CHINA, YOU MAY NOTE THAT WE DO NOT ATTACH PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS DOCUMENT. IT APPEARS SIMILAR TO OTHER MANUSCRIPTS THAT DISSIDENTS HAVE SMUGGLED OUT OF THE USSR IN RECENT YEARS, AND WHOEVER THE AUTHOR IS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT HE IS EITHER WELL-CONFIDENTIAL

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PLACED OR HAS ACCESS TO INSIDE INFORMATION. WHILE THE DOCUMENT MAY REFLECT THE CONCERN OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE USSR OVER THE PROSPECTS OF WAR WITH CHINA, IT CONTAINS NUMEROUS FACTUAL INACCURACIES AND DOES NOT ACCORD WITH OUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD THE PRC. RUSH

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